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AFTER AUTONOMY
Carl E. Schneider'

To rest upon a formula is a slumber that, prolonged, means
death.

Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Ideals and Doubts
I.

INTRODUCTION

The communists ... are on the one hand, practically, the most
advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of
every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on
the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of
the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the line
of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the
proletarian movement.
Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels
The Communist Manifesto
1

Bioethicists today are like Bolsheviks on the death of Lenin.
· Chauncey Stillman Professor of Law and Professor of Internal
Medicine, University of Michigan. I am grateful to the editors of the Wake
Forest Law Review for bravely and generously permitting me to abandon the
conventions of law review editing. They have duly pointed out the errors of
form and style that you are about to encounter, and I cheerfully relieve them of
all responsibility for every solecism. For a justification of my willfulness and an
invitation to my colleagues to join me in it, see Carl E. Schneider, The Book
Review Issue: An Owner's Manual, 96 Michigan L Rev 1383 (1998). For the
reasons given in Richard A Posner, Goodbye to the Bluebook, 53 U Chicago L
Rev 1343 (1986), I follow the University of Chicago Manual of Legal Citation
(Lawyers Co-operative, 1989).
From first to last, Mark Hall has been the but-for cause of this essay. I
proffer him all the thanks at my command, provided that he pass her fair share
on to Diana. It is also a pleasure to thank the participants in the Wake Forest
workshop for their perceptive comments on this essay. Rebecca Dresser was
specifically assigned to comment on it, and she showed yet again why she is one
of the most valuable and admirable people in bioethics.
1. I need a shorthand word for a varied group. So by bioethicists I mean
people who practice and write about bioethics generally, people who write about
the legal regulation of bioethical issues, and people who write such regulations.
This group obviously varies from category to category and within categories.
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They have, rather to their surprise, won the day. Their principle of
autonomy is dogma. Their era of charismatic leadership is over.
Their work of Weberian rationalization, of institutionalizing
principle and party, has begun. The liturgy is reverently recited,
but the vitality of Lenin's "What Is To Be Done?" has yielded to the
vacuity of Stalin's "The Foundations of Leninism." Effort once
lavished on expounding ideology is now devoted to establishing
associations, organizing degree programs, installing bioethicist
commissars in every hospital, and staffing IRB soviets. Not-sosecret police prowl the libraries hunting counter-revolutionaries and
other wreckers; anxious academics denounce deviationist colleagues.
A field once comprising diverse people from diverse backgrounds
with diverse perspectives is increasingly populated by standard
academics with standard academic opinions.
Nevertheless, the samizdat literature persistently asserts that
the policy of autonomy is betraying its promise. Explication of the
autonomy principle is becoming repetitive and arid. Programs
always need one more revision, one more Five Year Plan, before
they can actually begin to work. Life in the vanguard of the
(patient) proletariat grows irksome when the proletariat is so balky
and ungrateful. Surely somewhere the next great bioethical idea is
slouching toward Moscow to be born.
The bioethical apparat, of course, insists that the only cure for
the ills of autonomy is more autonomy. The apparat not only
reiterates the principle; it has raised the stakes in two ways. First,
as it has become undeniable that in area after area patients remain
far from making genuinely autonomous decisions, the list of things
doctors, hospitals, and researchers must do if they are really and
truly to honor patients' autonomy grows and grows. One modest
proposal, for instance, demands that patients be told not only the
benefits and risks of proposed treatments but also imagines that
(take a deep breath):
(1) "Providers" should undertake an "in-depth exploration" of
patients' "affective and cognitive processes."
(2) Providers should "explore uncertainties and limitations
both in the provider's own knowledge and in the state of the
science."
(3) "[P]roviders must understand and disclose their own
motivations, beliefs, and values to patients."
(4)

"[P]roviders ought to explore what kind of role

Academic bioethicists range from quite sophisticated to quite dogmatic. Clinical
bioethicists tend more toward the rustic. Courts, legislatures, and agencies can
seem hardly subtler. See Marsha Garrison & Carl E. Schneider, The Law of
Bioethics: Individual Autonomy and Social Regulation (West, 2002).
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expectations [about how decisions should be made] the patient
has for herself and her provider."
(5) "[I]nformed consent ought to be individualized ... and
take place in the context of an ongoing relationship with a
2
trusted health care provider."
In what world could all this happen? And in that world, would
patients then make autonomous decisions?
The second way the stakes are being raised for the autonomy
principle is by the gradual acceptance of "mandatory autonomy."
This is the idea that patients not only are entitled to make their own
3
decisions but have an ethical or social duty to do so. In its most
robust form, mandatory autonomy still has relatively few avowed
proponents, but increasingly potent versions of it increasingly
appear in the writings not just of bioethicists, but also of doctors and
4
patients (and, floridly, in the medical students I teach).
Yet between the idea and the reality falls the shadow. Even
while the apparat raises the stakes for autonomy, discontent with
its predominance proliferates. No one rejects autonomy entirely, but
at the level of theory two criticisms are now long standing. The first
criticism acknowledges the value of the principle but suggests that
competing principles are too regularly scanted. (And now abideth
beneficence, social justice, and autonomy, these three; but the
greatest of these is autonomy.) The second criticism contends that
the autonomy principle, while estimable and essential, promotes
deleterious attitudes, perhaps principally by underwriting a
corrosive individualism that alienates people from their family,
friends, and physicians.
These criticisms are apt, but they hardly relieve the suffocating
hegemony of the autonomy principle. That principle is too well
entrenched, and the criticisms offer no substitute for it, much less a
substitute with ready appeal. They do not even offer satisfying
complements to it. The criticisms acknowledge the necessity of the
autonomy principle and only want to confine it to its proper sphere.
Yet what is that sphere and how should autonomy be modulated and
offset by other principles? Little can be said in the abstract; little
gets said in concrete cases.
The problem is not just intellectual; it is political. Bioethics was
born a reform movement and adamantly remains one. It is a
movement with an enemy-medical imperialism. Such movements
welcome intellectuals only as long as they are politically useful; they
2. Gail Geller et al, "Decoding" Informed Consent: Insights from Women
Regarding Breast Cancer Susceptibility Testing, Hastings Center Report 28
(March/Aprill997).
3. I investigate this idea at length in The Practice of Autonomy: Patients,
Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998).
4. This idea too I explore at length ibid.
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loathe renegades. He that is not with me is against me: and he that
gathereth not with me scattereth. And the autonomy principle is a
political symbol as well as the fons et origo of the faith. Concessions
on matters of symbol are dangerous.
It is time for glasnost. No field should go for decades without
rigorous self-scrutiny, and bioethics has been oddly incurious about
itself. But how do we make self-examination productive? Many
approaches are necessary, no single one suffices, if only because the
field is such a patchwork of subjects, disciplines, and problems.
Here I want to suggest one starting point. Bioethics may be the
study of ethical problems, but bioethicists have always wanted to
shape public policy. If that is the goal of bioethics, the first step in
evaluating it is to ask whether bioethical policy is successful.
Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them.
But how are we to evaluate bioethical policies? There is a
standard answer to this question--do the programs' benefits exceed
their cost? This is a question I can hardly remember a bioethicist
posing. For example, bioethics was born insisting that researchers
regularly abused their subjects. The solution was the IRB. Today,
thousands-tens of thousands?--of people whose time is ruinously
expensive spend hundreds of thousands-millions?--of hours
reviewing thousands and thousands of research proposals. How
many ethically intolerable proposals are caught, and how many
make it through the gauntlet? How many useful and harmless
proposals are delayed or destroyed?
The costs of IRBs are
immediately obvious and obviously large. The marginal benefits
could be great but may well be small. And there must be cheaper
means of achieving the goal.
Consider another centerpiece of bioethics-informed consent.
The seminal case of Canterbury v. Spence blandly (but quite
typically) instituted a new legal regime of informed consent without
betraying a drachma's worth of interest in whether its gains
justified its costs. And who asks whether the prolonged and
extensive effort to promulgate living wills is worth the candle? In
short, it is a poor policy discipline that is more devoted to extending
principles to their logical conclusions than to finding the right
balance among conflicting goods and the right distribution of social
costs, yet bioethics is that discipline.
Bioethicists ignore these questions partly because they
believe-more or less explicitly-that cost-benefit analysis is wrong.
This belief seems to have two bases. First, bioethical programs
serve such ineffable goals that it would be wrong to think of them in
economic terms. This may be what the Department of Health and
Human Services had in mind in its rationale for its ruinous HIPAA
regulations. HHS grudgingly conceded that the "costs and benefits
of a regulation must, of course, be considered as a means of
identifying and weighing options." But in the same paragraph HHS
warned that, because privacy is a "fundamental right ... it must be
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viewed differently from any ordinary economic good."5
Here
bioethicists are poorly served by the grandiosity of the terms in
which they peddle their proposals. How can you criticize, much less
abandon, a program, however expensive, that purports to enhance
human rights? What is money compared with human dignity? The
problem, of course, is that so many programs can be justified in
similarly grand terms that we cannot possibly afford them all. The
issue is not whether to pursue lofty goals; it is how to pursue them
efficiently so that we can husband our resources for the many lofty
calls made on them. And no goal, however worthy, justifies
ineffective programs.
The second bioethical objection to cost-benefit analysis seems to
be that it works badly. There is much in this criticism, to be sure.
Benefits and costs are hard to measure, since they are often diffuse
and sometimes hard to monetize. But this does not mean that no
insights can be gained by careful and clever attempts to weigh costs
and benefits. And what is the alternative to such analysis? Policymaking unable to eliminate even the most outrageous expenses and
ineffective programs is doomed to foolishness and fatuity. Finally, if
bioethicists really believe that the costs and benefits of programs
cannot ever be intelligently assessed, surely they should doubt their
ability to understand the world well enough to write regulations for
it in the first place. The difficulty of cost-benefit analysis should be
a constraint on law-making, not carte blanche.
If we are to assess the costs and benefits of bioethical programs,
we need to identify their goals. These are numerous, but if we
reflect on the (very central) aspects of bioethics that deal with the
6
patient, one fact stands out: at the heart of bioethics and bioethical
policy has been the effort genuinely to confide decisions to patients
and genuinely to equip patients to make them competently. This is
the summum bonum of the bioethical agenda in area after area.
For example. Most medical decisions involve contemporary
treatment decisions for competent patients, and the centerpiece of
bioethical policy-informed consent-has generally been expected to
equip patients to make their own decisions about how to be treated
and whether to participate in research. So powerful has that idea
been that, for example, it has in only a few decades obliterated
ancient ideas about treatment at the end of life. Thus assisted
suicide has gone in my lifetime from being unthinkable to being
taken seriously as a constitutional right, becoming law in one state,
and nearly becoming law in several others.
5. Department of Health and Human Services, Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Federal Register 82462, 82464
(2000). On the regulations, see Carl E. Schneider, HIPAA-cracy, Hastings
Center Report 11 (January/February 2006).
6. Another shorthand term. I include in it anyone who must make a
decision about receiving medical attention, not least a research subject.
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More recently, bioethical policy has sought to extend the
authority of patients by permitting them to make decisions in a
competent today for an incompetent tomorrow, through advance
directives. And when contemporaneous medical decisions must be
made for formerly competent patients, bioethical policy has largely
wanted surrogates to try to duplicate the decision the patients
would have made.
Even bioethical policy about reproduction has been based on
views about the moral and constitutional significance of the
pregnant woman as decision-maker. This was (apparently) at the
core of Roe v. Wade. And even critics of that case sometimes adopt
the language of decision. Thus some states have tried to specify
information women seeking abortions must be given about fetal life
and alternatives to abortion.
Another kind of medical decision is currently becoming
prominent-"consumer-directed health care."
As health-care
financing recalcitrantly continues to puzzle us, as managed care
stubbornly seems to disappoint, lustrous hopes are cherished that
all will finally be well if decisions can be transferred to patients. If
only patients can purchase health insurance adapted to their wants
and make cost part of their treatment decisions, will they not get
better care at saner cost?7
In sum, bioethical policy has centrally aimed at confiding more
and more medical decisions to more and more kinds of patients in
more and more kinds of ways. But bioethical policy has not just
sought to provide patients with the authority to make decisions; it
has also labored to assure them the wherewithal-especially the
information-to make decisions wisely: Patients' consent to
treatment and participation in research is supposed to be informed.
The PSDA demands that patients be told about advance directives.
HIPAA requires that patients be elaborately notified of privacy
policies.
Ambitious provisions are being made for supplying
information to purchasers of health plans and medical care. And so
on.
Bioethics, in short, has a core agenda of some coherence. How,
then, if we evaluate bioethics by assessing not the merits of the
principle it professes but the success of the policies it promotes?
What are the fruits of the program to equip patients to make the
health-care decisions that affect them? It is through this question
that I propose that we re-examine bioethics. The best way to refresh
bioethics is not to grope for a new organizing principle, but rather to
assess the content and consequences of bioethics' agenda. If that
agenda is succeeding, bioethics need not be reconceived. If that
agenda has largely failed, we will have added reason to reconceive
7. For a good review of these developments, see Mark A. Hall, Paying for
What You Get and Getting What You Pay For: Legal Responses to ConsumerDriven Health Care, 69 Law & Contemporary Problems (forthcoming 2006).
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bioethics, have evidence about the sources of bioethics' weaknesses,
and have hints about directions for a new bioethics. If a new
bioethics is necessary. And possible.

II.

THE F AlLURE OF THE AUTONOMY POLICY:
SAMPLING THE EVIDENCE

For which of you, intending to build a tower, sitteth not down
first, and counteth the cost, whether he have sufficient to finish
it? Lest haply, after he hath laid the foundation, and is not
able to finish it, all that behold it begin to mock him ....

Luke 14:28-29
At this point, I confront a problem: I anticipate that evaluating
the success of bioethical policy will identify such crushing problems
that a new agenda might emerge from the inquiry. But we can't be
sure until the evaluation is done. That will take many years and
much effort, if it happens at all. So why should we think the inquiry
will justify its costs and engender new understandings of bioethics?
The short answer: There is already evidence that a perilously large
part of the bioethical agenda has fallen intolerably and irremediably
short of the expectations that inspired and would justify it. In this
little essay I can hardly begin to touch on the (truly) thousands of
relevant studies; they will be surveyed in the book I am writing. So
for now, a few woefully abbreviated examples.
A.

Informed Consent
And truly it demands something godlike in him who has cast
off the common motives of humanity and has ventured to trust
himself for a taskmaster. High be his heart, faithful his will,
clear his sight, that he may in good earnest be doctrine, society,
law, to himself, that a simple purpose may be to him as strong
as iron necessity is to others!

Ralph Waldo Emerson
Self-Reliance
Consider first informed consent, perhaps the oldest and most
basic legal implementation of bioethical principles. What would it
take for informed consent to equip patients to make medical
decisions adequately? First, doctors would have to give patients
information. Second, patients would have to hear, understand,
remember, and assimilate the information. Third, patients would
have to analyze the information critically and insightfully. Alas, the
evidence mauls the long-nurtured hopes about each of these points.
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1. Informing Patients
The first requirement of informed consent is that doctors inform
patients.
Do they, after all these years?
The evidence is
disheartening. Braddock et al 8 recently studied discussions between
doctors and patients, looking particularly at "(1) the patient's role in
decision making, (2) the nature of the decision, (3) alternatives, (4)
pros (benefits) and cons (risks) of the alternatives, (5) uncertainties
associated with the decision, (6) an assessment of the patient's
understanding of the decision, and (7) an exploration of the patient's
preferences." In a nutshell, "the completeness of informed decision
making was low.... [F]ew decisions (9.0%) met criteria for
completeness of informed decision making. Completeness of
discussion of decisions varied by decision complexity. Whereas
17.2% ofbasic decisions were complete, none ofthe intermediate and
only 1 (0.5%) of the complex decisions were complete."
Variation was considerable: "Patients were often told the nature
of the intervention (basic, 66.1 %; complex, 83.9%), but there was
seldom discussion of alternatives (5.5%-29.5%), pros and cons (2.3%26.3%), or uncertainties associated with the decision (1.1 %-16.6%).
Physicians occasionally discussed the patient's role in decision
making (5%-18.4%) and elicited patient preferences (17.8%-27.2%).
Physicians rarely explored whether patients understood the decision
(0.9%-6.9%)." The only good news was that generally, the more
complex the decision, the more thorough the discussion. "The most
striking increases were in alternatives (5-fold increase), pros and
cons (10-fold increase), and uncertainties (16-fold increase).
Discussion of the patient's role, discussion of the nature of the
decision, and ascertainment of patient preference also showed
significant increases from basic to complex categories .... "
2.
Understanding Information
Even if doctors somehow informed patients thoroughly, patients
would have to understand what they are told. Here, the data are
also dismaying. Ponder the Herz study of 106 patients facing
"routine neurosurgical procedures."9
Twenty-two of them
"underwent anterior cervical discectomy and interbody spinal fusion
procedures, and 84 underwent lumbar laminectomies." Patients
were educated in three stages (that were apparently developed "in
First, the
collaboration with a doctoral level lay educator").
physician explained "the spinal anatomy and physiology," the
procedure, the "reasons for considering surgery," the surgical
techniques, the non-surgical alternatives to the procedure, and the
8. Clarence H. Braddock et al, Informed Decision Making in Outpatient
Practice: Time to Get Back to Basics, 282 JAMA 2313 (1999).
9. David A. Herz et al, Informed Consent: Is It a Myth?, 30 Neurosurgery
453 (1992).
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"[o]perative goals and aspects of postoperative care." The surgeon
used "printed materials and anatomical models" to make his points
more clearly, he invited questions, and he asked patients to describe
in their own words what they had learned.
Second, patients and their families and friends were invited to
an "education conference, performed by a Master's level nurse
educator, covering the same topics." Like the surgeon, the nurse
used visual aids, solicited questions, and tried to test patients'
understanding orally. Third, patients spoke again with the surgeon.
"There was further opportunity to ask questions and receive
information regarding any perceived gaps in knowledge."
Directly after meeting with the nurse, patients were tested on
what they learned. When given multiple-choice questions, patients
answered 53.1% of the questions correctly. Asked open-ended
questions, patients' scores sunk to 34%. Better educated patients
had higher scores than less well educated patients, but even
patients "with graduate education" scored only 64.8% and 36.5%
(multiple choice and open-ended, respectively). More particularly,
scores on questions about the nature of the illness and details of the
proposed surgery were 67% and 52%. Scores on questions about the
risks of the surgery were 50% and 22.8%. Scores on questions about
post-operative care were 26.7% and 43%. And scores on questions
about the goals and benefits of the surgery were 35% and 26%.
The Herz study investigates an exceptionally energetic,
exhaustive, and exhausting attempt to inform patients, an attempt
that could not be replicated in the ordinary clinical setting. Fischer
10
et al describe a somewhat more realistic situation. Physicians with
a mean age of thirty-seven and a mean of 11 years of experience
were asked to "discuss 'advance directives"' with some of their own
patients (whom they had known for an average of two and a half
years) who were either at least sixty-five or suffering from a serious
illness. Only 70% of these conversations mentioned CPR. "The
patients who had these discussions greatly overestimated their
chances of survival after an in-hospital cardiopulmonary arrest."
Their "median estimate of the probability of survival to hospital
discharge was 70%, compared with a 20% median probability of
survival stated by their physicians." There were "no significant
differences in responses between patients" who had discussed CPR
and those who had not when they were asked whether people
usually need a ventilator after CPR.
The bad news marches on: "Patients whose discussions included
mechanical ventilation had a poor understanding of what this
procedure entails, and a significant number harbored important
misconceptions .... No [sic] subject who discussed ventilators had a
10. Gary S. Fischer et al, Patient Knowledge and Physician Predictions of
Treatment Preferences After Discussion of Advance Directives, 13 J General
Internal Medicine 447 (1998).
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good understanding of what they involved, and 50% had a poor
understanding .... " Put this in perspective. "Fair understanding''
(a step up from "poor understanding'') is this:
Interviewer: Do you know how it [ventilation] works to make
you breathe?
Patient: No ....
Interviewer: What do you think it would be like to be on one?
Patient: Oh, I don't want to be on one.
Interviewer: OK. Do you have any idea what it might be like to
be one?
Patient: I don't know.

Almost a quarter of the patients in this study already had an
advance directive. One might hope that they would already know
the relevant medical facts. But "[p)articipants who had previously
written ADs did not have better knowledge of CPR or mechanical
ventilation on any of these measures. In fact, those who had ADs
were more likely to express the [false] view that ventilators directly
kept the heart beating .... "
In sum, Fischer et al conclude that "patients left the
conversations with serious misunderstandings about CPR and
mechanical ventilation."
Did these patients perceive the
unreliability of their knowledge and draw conclusions from it
cautiously? No. Fischer et al comment that one "of the most
disconcerting findings of this study was that patients expressed
strong preferences about treatments that they did not understand."
3. Analyzing Information
Even if patients receive information and understand it, they
cannot make good decisions unless they analyze it acutely. Here too
the evidence is discouraging. Bioethicists have little troubled to
understand how people make medical decisions. Dan Brock states a
measured and moderate version of the standard assumptions. The
physician gives the patient "facts about the diagnosis and about the
prognoses without treatment and with alternative treatments." The
patient provides "the values-his or her own conception of the
good-with which to evaluate these alternatives" and selects "the
11
one that is best for himself or herself."
This sounds straightforward enough, but the reality is
hopelessly different, as decades of psychological research have richly
11. Dan W. Brock, The Ideal of Shared Decision Making Between
Physicians and Patients, 1 Kennedy Institute of Ethics J 28, 28 (1991).
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shown. First, Brock's formulation assumes patients have "values" to
supply, have beliefs that are coherent and considered enough that
patients can deduce decisions from them. But people have better
things to do than devising abstract principles for dreadful problems
they hope will never arise. This is bad enough, yet the problem goes
much deeper. For most of us much of the time, we find out what we
value by observing and then justifying our choices. It is hardly too
much to say that our "values" are the explanations we give for our
decisions, not the source of them. So, Hibbard et al observe, much
"research shows that preferences are remarkably labile and
12
sensitive to the way a choice is described or framed." This suggests
that people "may not have existing preferences or beliefs about selfinterest, but, rather, construct them in the process of deciding ....
This new conception applies particularly to choices among options
that are important, complex, and unfamiliar, like those consumers
face in the current health care environment." As Richard Russo put
it in my favorite academic novel (Straight Man), "The truth is, we
never know for sure about ourselves .... [O]nly after we've done a
thing do we know what we'll do .... Which is why we have spouses
and children and parents and colleagues and friends, because
someone has to know us better than we know ourselves."
Second, the canonical view of bioethics not only assumes that
people have reliable values to apply; it assumes that they reason
effectively about how to promote those values.
However, a
substantial literature now catalogs the ways that human beings
misperceive reality and employ short cuts and rules of thumb which
may work well in familiar situations but which systematically
malfunction in less familiar ones. Professor Sage summarizes some
of that literature:
[P]eople make striking and predictable errors when evaluating
risks and either accepting, rejecting, or taking action to reduce
them. These "cognitive biases" can be divided into "framing
errors," which lead people to ignore actual probabilities and
overestimate the likelihood of events that are familiar or
salient, and "valuation errors," which induce people to overpay
to avoid small, near-certain losses or lock in small, nearcertain gains, to live with significant risks that they
mistakenly believe they can control, or to insist on eliminating
minuscule risks of especially dreaded events. 13
Thus, for example, people

12. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care:
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 402
(1997).
13. William M. Sage, Accountability Through Information: What the Health
Care Industry Can Learn from Securities Regulation 12 (Milbank Memorial
Fund, 2000).
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consistently underestimate personal risk for hazards in certain
situations: when the hazard is one with which individuals
have had little personal experience; when hazards are
perceived as low in probability; or when hazards are judged to
be controllable by personal action. These types of hazards may
include the potential for catastrophic illness, serious injury, or
even less serious morbidities.
This optimism bias in
14
comparative riskjudgments is robust and widespread.
The literature on how people generally and patients particularly
make decisions is so complex that it can hardly be summarized here.
To provide a better sense of the evidence, I will sketch one of the
many problems in making medical decisions that bioethicists
virtually ignore. Decisions require us to predict how we will feel
about future states.
And how well do we predict our own
preferences? In brief, we struggle ineptly to predict our own tastes,
behavior, and emotions even over short periods and under familiar
circumstances. We make systematic mistakes in anticipating what
we will enjoy. We regularly "miswant."15
This seems horribly counter-intuitive. But hearken to a-quite
incomplete-list of errors we make in forecasting our feelings:
16
People mispredict what poster they will like, how intensely they
17
will relish yogurt, which snacks they will prefer over the next three
18
weeks, how environmental changes will affect their well-being, 19
how attached they will become to a free coffee mug, 20 how distressed
they will be on receiving the results of tests for HIV21 and for
22
Huntington's disease, whether they will be happier living in
Michigan or California, 23 how greatly they will enjoy a bicycle trip, 24
14. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care:
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 401
(1997).
15. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in
the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and
Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178-79 (Cambridge U Press,
2000).
16. Charles H. Griffith, III, et al, Knowledge and Experience with
Alzheimer's Disease, 4 Archives of Family Medicine 780 (1995).
17. Daniel Kahneman & Jackie Snell, Predicting a Changing Taste: Do
People Know What They Will Like?, 5 J Behavioral Decision Making 187 (1992).
18. ltamar Simonson, The Effect of Purchase Quantity and Timing on
Variety-Seeking Behavior, 27 J Marketing Research 150 (1990).
19. George Loewenstein & Shane Frederick, Predicting Reactions to
Environmental Change, in Max H. Bazerman et al, eds, Environment, Ethics,
and Behavior (New Lexington Press, 1997).
20. George Loewenstein & Daniel Adler, A Bias in the Prediction of Tastes,
105 Economic J 929 (1995).
21. Elaine M. Sieff et al, Anticipated Versus Actual Reaction to HIV Test
Results, 112 American J Psychology 297 (1999).
22. Sandy Wiggins et al, The Psychological Consequences of Predictive
Testing for Huntington's Disease, 327 New England J Medicine 1401 (1992).
23. David Schkade & Daniel Kahneman, Does Living in California Make
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how joyful Bill Clinton's election would make them, how gratified
26
they will be to ace a test, how painfully criticism will wound
28
27
them, how distraught they will be if their team loses, how
29
agonizing a visit to the dentist and other tormentors will be, and,
well, I could go on in this vein for some time.
We not only mispredict our emotions; we mispredict our
behavior.
People go on dates planning to refrain from having sex, engage
in foreplay with the expectation of using a condom at the next
stage, and initiate sex with the plan to "interrupt" prior to the
critical moment. As Gold found in interviews with gay men
about their attempts to practice safe sex, however, such
resolutions often break down in the "heat of the moment.',3o
Profligacy is as unpredictable as passion: "[L]arge numbers of credit
card users expect to maintain a zero credit balance but fail to do
31
so .... " We can't even anticipate how much we will buy at the
32
grocery store.
Worse, pondering choices does not always improve predictions.
Some of the people researchers instructed to pick a poster "were
asked to think about why they liked or disliked each poster ('deep
thinkers') and others were not ('shallow thinkers')." Perversely, "the
deep thinkers were the least satisfied."33 And people asked "to
predict how they would feel about the experience [of eating yogurt]
over time [eight weeks] ... expected to like it less over time but in
fact liked it more .... " But "[t]he most striking finding ... was the

People Happy? A Focusing Illusion in Judgments of Life Satisfaction, 9
Psychological Science 340 (1998). Living in California doesn't make you
happier than living in Michigan. Sometimes I wonder about this one.
24. Terence R. Mitchell et al, Temporal Adjustments in the Evaluation of
Events: The "Rosy View," 33 J Experimental Social Psychology 421 (1997).
25. Daniel T. Gilbert et al, The Trouble With Vronsky: Impact Bias in the
Forecasting of Future Affective States, in L. F. Barrett & P. Salovey eds, The
Wisdom in Feeling: Psychological Processes in Emotional Intelligence 114, 11920 (2002).
26. Ibid at 120.
27. Daniel T. Gilbert et al, Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J Personality & Social Psychology 617 (1998).
28. Timothy D. Wilson et al, Focalism: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 78 J Personality & Social Psychology 349 (2000).
29. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting
Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology 91 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999).
30. Ibid at 93.
31. Ibid at 94.
32. Daniel T. Gilbert & Timothy D. Wilson, Miswanting: Some Problems in
the Forecasting of Future Affective States, in Joseph P. Forgas, ed, Feeling and
Thinking: The Role of Affect in Social Cognition 178 (Cambridge U Press, 2000).
33. Ibid at 183.

424

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41

near-zero correlation between individual subjects' anticipated and
actual reactions to the experience. Subjects' feelings did change
substantially over time, but they had little idea, at the outset, about
34
how they would change."
I have been describing failures to anticipate one's responses to
events. These are partly failures to anticipate which reactions one
will have. More commonly, they are failures to anticipate the
intensity and the duration of one's reactions. These failures of
anticipation have a common tendency-to over-estimate the
intensity and duration of emotions. Your pleasure at the victory of
your candidate on Tuesday is neither so profound nor so enduring as
you expected on Monday. Indeed, "[t]he most prevalent error found
in research on affective forecasting is the impact bias, whereby
people overestimate the impact of future events on their emotional
35
reactions. "
I have taken pains to describe one element of human reasoning
in order to provide a better feel for my larger argument-that people
reason in ways that bedevil the work of making medical decisions.
But the bioethical view of human decisions is exceptionally naive. It
is this naive view that makes possible much bioethical thinking. It
allows bioethicists to believe that patients will make good decisions
if they are given information about their choice of treatments, that
people can anticipate their situation and preferences well enough to
write useful living wills, that people reason so reliably that family
members can replicate their decisions when patients are
incompetent, and that we all can be made sagacious purchasers of
medical insurance plans and medical treatments. And so we are in
endless error hurled.

4. Closing Thoughts on Informed Consent
Can informed consent be made to do better? Probably, but not
much. We've been trying hard for decades. Even determined and
lavish efforts in favorable circumstances regularly fail. They fail
because teaching and learning are much harder than bioethicists
think. (Are their bluebooks really so much better than mine?) Nor
is the problem merely local: Peter Schuck observes that similar
problems
appear in Canada, Europe, and Japan-countries whose
organization of health care, political-regulatory structures, and
professional culture and practices differ from ours in many
34. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting
Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology 88 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999). Ice-cream eaters, on
the other hand, accurately predicted that they would like it less over the eight
weeks.
35. Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 345, 353 (2003).
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fundamental respects. The fact that similar discursive
patterns are universal ... strongly implies that these patterns
are so deeply rooted in the psychology and structure of a
physician-patient relationship as to be largely immune to
change through legal doctrine or other exogenous factors. 36
The evidence about informed consent is now several decades
old. It is mountainous. It is damning. When failure is the norm, it
is time to ask whether there are ineradicable reasons for the failure
and time to go back to basics.

B.

Living Wills
[An] exception to the doctrine that individuals are the best
judges of their own interest, is when an individual attempts to
decide irrevocably now what will be best for his interest at some
The presumption in favor of
future and distant time.
individual judgement is only legitimate, where the judgment is
grounded on actual, and especially on present, personal
experience; not where it is formed antecedently to experience,
and not suffered to be reversed even after experience has
condemned it.

John Stuart Mill
Principles of Political Economy
Another prominent item in the bioethics agenda has been the
living will. Living wills have now been investigated at length and in
37
detail. They have failed and cannot be rescued: They seem not to
affect the care patients receive. Even if they did, they would almost
surely not increase the likelihood that patients would receive the
care they wanted. This is not only what the evidence shows, it is
what reason suggests. First, it is exceptionally difficult for patients
to acquire information about the illnesses from which they might be
suffering when incompetent, the treatments that might be available,
and the consequences of the maladies and treatments. Second,
patients can rarely survey all this information and then reach
decisions about the treatment they would want that actually match
the decisions they would have made if competent. Third, attempts
to put preferences of the relevant kinds into accurate and useful
words have persistently failed. Fourth, getting the living will to the
right place has been harder than first seemed likely. Fifth, the
living will must be relevant, read, and understood, requirements
which are regularly frustrated. Sixth, the joker in the deck is that
36. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 Yale L J 899
(1994).
37. In this paragraph I draw on Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider,
Enough: The Failure of the Living Will, Hastings Center Report 30 (March/April
2004).
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patients stubbornly resist writing living wills.
Consider just one of the steps that would have to be taken to
salvage the living will-doctors would have to give patients enough
information for them to make good prospective decisions.
Communication between doctors and patients about end-of-life
decisions has been the subject of decades-long effort. And how, after
all those years of adjuration does that communication actually
occur? One spectacularly ambitious project-the SUPPORT studyinvestigated over nine thousand gravely ill patients in five
38
prominent teaching hospitals over four years. Doctors were given
reports on patients' prognoses and were told patients' feelings about
CPR, treating pain, receiving information, and advance directives.
Specially trained nurses promoted communication among patients,
their surrogates, and their doctors. Succinctly, SUPPORT worked
"no significant change in the timing of DNR orders, in physicianpatient agreement about DNR orders, in the number of undesirable
days [patients experienced], in the prevalence of pain, or in the
resources consumed." The experiment did not alter patients'
preferences about DNR orders, their communication with doctors, or
their satisfaction with their care. Only 15% of the doctors discussed
the information they received with patients (or surrogates). In sum,
despite a prodigiously elaborate and costly program, almost nothing
budged.
Let me give flesh to the statistical skeleton with a prominent
doctor's horrifying description in a prominent magazine of how he
"discussed" these issues with his patient:
"Most people say that if they reach a point in the illness
when their brain is impaired, and there is no likelihood of
improving their quality oflife, then nothing should be done to
keep them artificially alive, through machines like respirators.
It's essential, Maxine, that I know what you want done if we
reach that point."
"I-I don't think I would want that," she said haltingly.
"You mean that you would want only comfort measures to
alleviate pain, and nothing done to prolong your life, like a
respirator or cardiac resuscitation?"
"Yes, I think so," Maxine whispered.

38. SUPPORT Principal Investigators, A Controlled Trial to Improve Care
for Seriously Ill Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591
(1995).
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I nodded. This was her "end-of-life directive." I would put
it in writing in her medical chart. 39
This is how people decide to die? This is how a well-known
physician didactically describes his own methods in a popular
magazine? First, Groopman virtually strong-arms his patient into
accepting the course he prefers.
He is surely making a
recommendation, but he never warns Maxine that that is what he is
doing. He cloaks his recommendation in the ratification of "most
people," but do "most people" say any such thing? Groopman's
choice of words is tendentious. He speaks, for example, of being
"artificially" alive. What does that mean? Is there such a category?
What is more, when Maxine seems to be acquiescing, Groopman
does not trouble to find out whether she understands his proposal.
Worse, he closes the sale briskly by transmuting her tentative
murmurs into final affirmations. Her first reaction to his proposal
actually seems to be to contradict it. (All depends on what you think
"that" refers to; grammatically, it could refer to refusing treatment,
which she doesn't think she wants.) In any event, she speaks
"haltingly," and she says only that she doesn't think she wants
"that." Her second reaction is again phrased tentatively: she
"whispers" that she thinks she agrees with him, which implies that
she is not sure. But presto--behold the "end-of-life directive."
Second, observe how radically vague this "end-of-life directive"
is. It postulates a point when patients' brains are impaired and
"there is no likelihood of improving their quality of life." How
impaired?
Many things impair people's brains without their
wanting to die. Only egregious impairment ordinarily provokes
that.
But even "egregious impairment" gives scant guidance.
Another crucial phrase in this living will is "no likelihood of
improving" quality of life. Really? No likelihood? No chance?
Physicians hate to say anything so absolute. But if not "no"
likelihood, then what likelihood? And what treatments is she
forgoing? Groopman speaks of "machines like respirators." What
machine is like a respirator? Is Maxine objecting to being kept alive
or to being kept alive by machines?
Third, how much did Maxine understand about what was going
on? The "directive's" words are, as I just argued, wretchedly vague.
If Maxine is like most patients, she does not know what "a
respirator or cardiac resuscitation" might mean. Most appalling of
all, Maxine evidently had no idea she had just issued a binding
"end-of-life directive."
After all these years of advocating advance directives, is this
where we are? If Maxine dies because treatment is withheld, it will
be in the name of autonomy, and no questions will be asked. But
39. Jerome Groopman, Dying Words, New Yorker, October 28, 2002, at 62,

63.
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what is really going on here? Is all this just medical imperialism in
new guise? Has Groopman heard so often that doctors overtreat
patients at the end of life that he is determined it will not happen to
his patients? Does Groopman actually believe that genuinely
autonomous decisions are so easily come by? If it does nothing else,
the story of Maxine should drive us to confront clearly and honestly
what autonomy has come to mean and what it can realistically
mean.
But imagine a patient less vulnerable than poor Maxine and a
physician more helpful than (adjectives fail me) Groopman. Imagine
a healthy patient with time and resources to devote to writing a
living will. And imagine that the patient had unfettered access to a
communicative physician. How well would that patient's living will
actually anticipate and communicate the decisions the patient would
have made if competent?
The problem, of course, lies not just in giving the authors of
living wills accurate information and useful assistance. It also lies
in patients' analysis of their choices and preferences. Recall now our
discussion of the problems people have predicting their reactions to
events and anticipating what will make them happy. If people
mispredict their reaction to homely, common experiences, they will a
fortiori misanticipate their reaction to the unfamiliar issues raised
by living wills, especially to hypothetical choices and disturbing
circumstances. Thomas Mann saw the problem:
The pity the well person felt for the sick-a pity that almost
amounted to awe, because the well person could not imagine
how he himself could possibly bear such suffering-was very
greatly exaggerated .... It was, in fact, the result of an error in
thinking, a sort of hallucination; in that the well man
attributed to the sick his own emotional equipment, and
imagined that the sick man was, as it were, a well man who
had to bear the agonies of the sick one-than which nothing
was further from the truth. For the sick man was-precisely
that, a40 sick man: with the nature and modified reactions of his
state.
More particularly, people regularly fail to anticipate how illness
and disability will affect them. Some of the most systematic
evidence of this failure comes from comparisons between the way
patients evaluate their lives and the way others evaluate those lives.
Discrepancies in these evaluations are chronic. For example, "the
general public estimates the health related quality of life (HRQoL)
of dialysis at the value of 0.39 (on a scale where 0 represents death
and 1 represents perfect health), whereas dialysis patients estimate
their HRQoL at 0.56 .... Patients without colostomies estimate the
40. Thomas Mann, The Magic Mountain 451 (H.T. Lowe-Porter trans.,
1968).
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HRQoL of living with a colostomy at 0.80, while patients with
41
colostomies rate their own HRQoL at 0.92."
Similarly, "[i]n one
study of 126 elderly outpatients with five common chronic
diseases ... Pearlman and Uhlmann found that patients generally
rated their quality of life to be slightly worse than 'good, no major
complaints,' but their physicians rated their quality of life as
significantly worse ... .'>42 The moral, of course, is that if people
cannot even perceive how patients they know are currently handling
illness, they cannot foresee how they themselves might someday
react to it.
In sum, the evidence about the living will closely resembles the
evidence about informed consent. In both cases, there is much
reason to doubt that patients receive enough sound information to
make good decisions, that they satisfactorily understand the
information they do receive, or that they analyze it with the acuity
they themselves would wish. And in both cases, there is little
reason to believe that any of these deficiencies can be adequately
remedied.
C.

Consumer-Directed Health Care
The whole thing reminds me of the uncomfortable feeling I
experienced when I first sought out investment advice . ...
[F]inancial advisers, well intentioned and competent as they
might have been, were all favoring their own financial
instruments. I concluded that I had ... to take the high-level
management of my investments into my own hands.
Similarly, ... that's the only viable choice any patient has. If
you look after your investments, I think you should look after
your life as well.
Investigate things, come to your own
conclusions, don't take any one recommendation as gospel.

Andy Grove
Taking on Prostate Cancer
The dernier cri in the ethics of health-care finance is "patientdirected health care." The AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs proclaims that "patients have a responsibility to learn as
much as they can about their choices of plans, including the exact
nature of the different benefits packages and their limitations.
Patients have a responsibility to make sure they know and
41. Peter A. Ubel et al, Whose Quality of Life? A Commentary Exploring
Discrepancies Between Health State Evaluations of Patients and the General
Public, 12 Quality of Life Research 599, 599 (Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2003) (footnotes omitted).
42. George Loewenstein & David Schkade, Wouldn't It Be Nice? Predicting
Future Feelings, in Daniel Kahneman et al, eds, Well-Being: The Foundations of
Hedonic Psychology 90, 92 (Russell Sage Foundation, 1999).
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understand the terms of their own health care plan."43 The claim is
that when people meet those responsibilities they will buy medical
insurance, subscribe to health-care plans, and purchase medical
goods and services so astutely that they will get what they want at
tolerable prices.
Perhaps it is too soon to evaluate this gloriously optimistic
proposal. However, minatory evidence is mounting rapidly. Here,
as elsewhere in bioethics, the seeds of failure lie first in the
difficulty of providing patients useful information. Only rarely do
people comprehend even crudely "the information infrastructure on
which the theory of competitive market and the theory of managed
care rest." Some information about prices is even "jealously guarded
proprietary information." Worse, information about "the quality of
care is generally unavailable or not trustworthy. Not even the
infection or complication rates experienced in hospitals are publicly
known. Such information on quality as is made available in the
media or on Web sites typically consists of mysteriously weighted
aggregate indexes that obscure the detailed information patients
would need in a competitive market.',4 4
But, as usual, there are reasons useful information is not
forthcoming. Not least, it is wickedly hard to put information in
terms consumers can use. And as usual, honorable efforts have
been made to tell patients what they need to know to make good
purchases. For example, experiments with HMO "report cards"
have sought to employ "several performance measures and plan
characteristics to compare multiple plans." Thus "the Minnesota
Health Data Institute distributed a 16-page, statewide report card
that featured comparison tables and color-coded graphs of consumer
satisfaction within categories of health plans and compared 38 plans
based on 20 performance measures." However, "less than half of
those seeing the report thought it was helpful for deciding on a plan.
Consumers found the report cards cumbersome, complex, and
detailed."45
Even precise and complete information is useless if it is
misunderstood. People read information through the prism of their
own knowledge. And their knowledge about the market for health
care is sadly distorted. For example, 30% of those surveyed in one
study "knew almost nothing about HMOs.'' Of the remaining
patients, "only 16 percent had adequate knowledge (scores of 76
percent or higher) to choose between traditional Medicare and an
43. Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association,
Ethical Issues in Managed Care, 273 JAMA 330 (1995). How many physicians,
much less patients, meet this standard?
44. Uwe E. Reinhardt, Can Efficiency in Health Care Be Left to the
Market?, 26 J Health Politics, Policy & Law 967, 986-87 (2001).
45. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care:
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 39698 (1997).
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HMO. More than 41 percent scored in the 'inadequate' range (scores
of 50 percent or less) .... " Only a third of those remaining patients
"understood how physicians are paid under a fee-for-service system,
and only about 40-50 percent understood that HMO doctors may be
paid on a capitation basis." In short, few "beneficiaries are well
Even those who use multiple
informed about their choices.
information sources to learn about health plans often have lessthan-adequate knowledge."" 6
All this means, at best, that consumers generally lack, as
Professor Sage writes, "baseline information that could provide
context for required disclosure. Therefore, health care consumers
can easily misinterpret even accurate data." In one study, for
example, "potential enrollees regarded report card data showing
high hospitalization rates of health plan enrollees for pneumonia as
showing leniency in approving inpatient treatment rather than
7
demonstrating failure to administer vaccinations.'"'
Decisions about buying medical care are enormously complex,
and people's needs are enormously various.
So people need
mountains of information. But the more information you have, the
harder it is to comprehend, remember, and analyze. Hibbard et al
observe that "a large body of empirical work" suggests "that the
integration of different types of information and values into a
decision is a very difficult cognitive process." Partly, "people can
process and use only a limited number of variables.'' This is true
even of experts. Thus, a study of handicappers for horse races found
that as "more information was used, confidence in the decisions
went up. However, predictive ability was as good with 5 variables
as with 10, 20, or 40 .... Further, the reliability of the choices
decreased as more information was made available. That is, when
individuals had more information, their ability to use it
'consistently' declined.'"'8 If experts falter, what hope for you and
me?
Even if consumers are offered the information the "contract"
view of regulation suggests they need, they will reject much of it.
For example, not only are patients ·ill-informed about physician
payment in managed care, "only about half say they want to know
such details.'"' 9 Even when people say they want information, they
routinely ignore it. For instance, "most consumers who have
comparative plan performance information do not use that
information in making their enrollment decisions, although most
46. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed
Choices?, 17 Health Affairs 181 (1998).
4 7. William M. Sage, Accountability Through Information: What the Health
Care Industry Can Learn from Securities Regulation (Milbank Memorial Fund,
2000).
48. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care:
Implications from Decision-Making Research, 75 Milbank Q 395 (1997).
49. Sage, Accountability at 36 (cited in note 4 7).
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50

say that plan quality is very important to them."
Patients have other problems in bringing themselves to consult
systematic information.
For one thing, such information is
generally "sterile compared with people's emotional investment in
health care." The measures used in systematic information "tend to
emphasize disease states and the processes that prevent or treat
them," but "consumers in focus groups show limited interest in or
ability to interpret technical information divorced from their
individual circumstances. Instead, ordinary people seem to prefer
51
subjective, relational information from 'people like them' .... " Yet
what is more notoriously misleading than the anecdote?
Dr. Johnson famously called a second marriage the triumph of
hope over experience. What can we call consumer-directed health
care? Mter our travail with informed consent, after our frustration
with living wills, why would anyone think that the problems of
explanation, comprehension, and analysis will vanish when people
are asked to purchase health insurance, health plans, and health
care?
Ill. MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
The human understanding is not a dry light, but is infused by
desire and emotion, which give rise to 'wishful science'. For
man prefers to believe what he wants to be true. He therefore
rejects difficulties, being impatient of inquiry; sober things,
because they restrict his hope; deeper parts of Nature, because
of his superstition; the light of experience, because of his
arrogance and pride, lest his mind should seem to concern itself
with things mean and transitory; things that are strange and
contrary to all expectation, because of common opinion.

Francis Bacon
Novum Organum

The evidence we have surveyed repeatedly demonstrates that
equipping people to make good decisions about complex, foreign, and
frightening issues is challenging far beyond the facile assumptions
of the bioethical agenda. It is therefore critical that, when that
agenda has been promoted through law, one device has been
overwhelmingly called on-mandatory disclosure. The examples are
familiar. Doctors must tell patients what they need to know to
make medical decisions. Researchers must tell patients about the
risks of participating in experiments. Hospitals must tell patients
about advance directives. Doctors and hospitals must tell patients
50. Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection"
Laws: Incomplete Contracts, Bounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85
Cornell L Rev 1, 70 (1999).
51. Sage, Accountability at 35-36 (cited in note 4 7).
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about their privacy regimes. "Virtually every bill . . . to regulate
managed care devotes major portions to information disclosure and
52
dissemination." The list goes on; I will not.
Mandatory disclosure is a hoary regulatory technique. And why
not, since it ought to work? Don't people making decisions need
information, want it, and use it? Doesn't an irresistible array of
arguments justify disclosure requirements? The moral rationale is
that disclosure liberates people from the servitude ignorance
creates. The prophylaxis rationale assumes that predators can be
discouraged if they must warn their prey. The market rationale
holds that the production and allocation of goods is best regulated
through markets and that markets work best when purchasers
know most. And the welfare rationale supposes that we enhance
people's well-being giving them the information they need to
organize their lives.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, disclosure requirements in
health law seem not to work as intended. Can they be fixed? Well,
consider the many other areas of law that deploy them. Are people
buying worthless stocks? Securities laws say, "Disclose!" Are people
borrowing money at usurious rates? Consumer protection laws say,
"Disclose!" Are people injured by things they buy? Productsliability law says, "Disclose!" Are police bullying criminal suspects
into waiving their rights? Miranda says, "Disclose!" Are people
signing disadvantageous marital agreements? Family law says to
the couple, "Disclose!"
Do these disclosure requirements work? Their goal is to
improve decisions. The baseline for evaluation, then, is the quality
of the decisions people would make were there no disclosure laws.
Crudely defined, success would mean improving decisions enough to
justify the costs of the disclosure requirement to the government,
disclosers, and recipients.
This standard of assessment is heroically challenging to apply.
However, I doubt it is often met. If disclosure requirements prosper
anywhere, it should be in securities markets, since they are
dominated by institutions which have reasons and resources to use
the information corporations disclose. But even there, scholars
cannot agree that corporations would disclose less were there no
securities laws (since corporations have economic incentives to
disclose information to investors) or that the disclosures that are
made improve investors' decisions.
Most other disclosure regimes look worse.
For example,
Miranda has "'little or no effect on a suspect's propensity to talk ....
Next to the warning label on cigarette packs, Miranda is the most
widely ignored piece of official advice in our society.' ... Not only
has Miranda largely failed to achieve its stated and implicit goals,
52. William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws
and American Health Care, 99 Columbia L Rev 1701, 1707-08 (1999).
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but police have transformed Miranda into a tool of law
enforcement .... "53 Another example. While the evidence of failure
is hardly uniform, "the efforts of researchers to prove by scientific
means that on-product warnings are indeed effective to modify
safety-related behavior in actual or simulated real-world
applications have generally yielded disappointing results." 54
This hardly bodes well for mandatory disclosures in medicine.
But perhaps we can understand more if we ask why disclosure
requirements work badly. Principally, disclosure succeeds only if
many onerous conditions are all met. Let us briskly survey eight of
them.
First, information must actually be provided. However,
disclosers often have reasons to withhold it, if only because
disclosures cost money and can compromise disclosers' interests.
Furthermore, disclosure requirements are hard to enforce: They
usually affect so many transactions that the law cannot supervise
them well administratively, and people from whom information is
withheld rarely are injured enough to make suits economically
sensible.
Second, the information disclosed must be the right
information-relevant, true, clear, complete. However, even willing
disclosers often not do not know what to disclose and how best to
disclose it. For example, some safety warnings apparently make
people less cautious, not more. Cigarette warnings seem to have
helped convince Americans that the dangers of smoking are greater
than they actually are. This might be all to the good. However, the
young start smoking partly because they over-estimate people's
ability to stop. This seems to call for another round of package
disclosures. Yet you can't tell people everything, because that
drowns them in more information than they can cope with.
Third, the audience must receive-and thus must perceive-the
information. But often the information is, and even must be,
inconspicuous. Furthermore, 40 to 44 million Americans, or roughly
one quarter of the US population, are functionally illiterate, another
50 million are marginally literate, and many of the rest have trouble
comprehending even modestly complex verbal and numerical data.
Fourth, recipients must attend to the information they perceive.
But recipients commonly fail to recognize the relevance and
significance of information or think they already know all they need
to. Thus, they are easily convinced that the trouble of grappling with
information will not be repaid. So how do you seize someone's
attention? One "of the most consistent findings in the literature ...
53. Richard A. Leo, Questioning the Relevance of Miranda in the TwentyFirst Century, 99 MichL Rev 1000, 1013, 1021 (2001).
54. Hildy Bowbeer & David S. Killoran, Liriano v. Hobart Corp.: Obvious
Dangers, The Duty to Warn of Safer Alternatives, and the Heeding Presumption,
65 Brooklyn L Rev 717, 757 (1999).
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is that a consumer's responsiveness to warnings is strongly affected
by perceived hazardousness." Those perceptions are influenced by
too much, including "the overall appearance of a product, ...
perceived controllability of the hazard and its harmful
consequences, . . . a person's ability to imagine various ways in
which an injury might occur while using a product, ... familiarity
with the product, . . . level of education or a person's abilities of
processing information, . . . and the presence, . . . salience, . . . and
content of warnings." Alas and of course, "[m]ost of these factors are
difficult to influence."55
Fifth, people must understand the information. This requires
the kind of analytic effort most of us resist. And rightly resist. AB
Whitehead wonderfully said, "It is a profoundly erroneous truism,
repeated by all copy-books and by eminent people when they are
making speeches, that we should cultivate the habit of thinking
about what we are doing. . . . . Civilization advances by extending
the number of important operations which we can perform without
thinking about them. Operations of thought are like cavalry
charges in a battle-they are strictly limited in number, they
require fresh horses, and must only be made at decisive moments."56
But even when we reluctantly recognize that the cavalry should
charge, we hate to bring out the fresh horses.
Sixth, recipients must believe what they are told. But people
scout information that does not fit their view of the world.
Furthermore, recipients often have reasons (good and bad) to fear
that disclosers are shaping information to serve their own interests
and not the recipients'. (How many suspects believe what the police
tell them? How many should?) Such attitudes make recipients all
too prone to spurn even true and good information.
Seventh, people must decide to use the information. But people
regularly resist incorporating new information into decisions, if only
because that demands still more labor. People must therefore be
convinced that their effort will be repaid.
Sometimes it is,
sometimes it isn't. You can't know until you've tried. You can't
know if trying is worth trying.
Eighth, people must use the information intelligently. The
woeful rarity of this even where you would expect it most is
suggested by shelves of books with titles like Why Smart People
Make Big Money Mistakes and How to Correct Them. Even
experienced investors overvalue their own judgment, are sooner
swayed by vivid than dry data, delusively imagine that new
evidence confirms their earlier opinions, and are addled by the
buzzing swarm of systematic faults in reasoning that befuddle us
55. Monica Trommelen, Effectiveness of Explicit Warnings, 25 Safety
Science 79 (1997).
56. Alfred North Whitehead, An Introduction to Mathematics 41-42 (Oxford
U Press, 1948).
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all. And so, for a small but chastening example, "[d]uring the
Internet frenzy, firms that announced that they were changing their
name to include 'dot.com' experienced abnormal returns, regardless
of whether the announcement coincided with a change in business
plan."57 To put this crucial point differently, people's decisions often
do not change, much less improve, with more information.
But why do lawmakers so often choose disclosure requirements
when evidence for their success is (at best) so elusive and (at worst)
so damning? One answer is that the structure of most law-making
does little to encourage assessments of disclosure rules. Those rules
are commonly inspired by indignation over genuine problems,
58
indignation inflamed by anecdote. Attention is directed to what is
wrong and the imperative of change, not to the effectiveness of the
law's means. Anyway, it seems obvious that disclosure works, and
there is no easy way to test its effectiveness in advance. And law is
made by just the people-the well-educated and well-situated-best
able to take advantage of disclosures and most convinced they want
them.
Furthermore, disclosure may be the only kind of regulation
available to the law-maker. For instance, courts can create a cause
of action against doctors who do not disclose information to patients,
but courts cannot establish an administrative apparatus to
supervise disclosure or medical treatment.
And delightfully,
disclosure requirements cost lawmakers a pittance, since they shift
the costs of regulation to the regulated entities. For example, the
Patient Self-Determination Act added farthings to the federal
budget, but it cost hospitals over $100,000,000 just to set up
59
compliance programs.
Finally, once disclosure rules have been
implemented, courts have no resources for or-it must be saidinterest in reviewing their effectiveness, and Congress has moved on
to other issues.
At this point, I want to emphasize a feature of medical decisions
that crucially affects all attempts to create a world in which patients
make good use of medical disclosures. Most writing on patients'
autonomy-judicial and academic-assumes patients yearn to make
medical decisions but are thwarted by medical imperialism. How
true is this? The studies reach a surprising and surprisingly
consistent conclusion: While many patients say they want to make
decisions, a very substantial number of patients say they do not.
Two studies give a keener sense of the research.

57. Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC,
56 Stanford L Rev 1, 14 (2003).
58. For a good description of a doleful example, see David A. Hyman, Drive·
Through Deliveries: Is "Consumer Protection" Just What the Doctor Ordered?, 78
North Carolina L Rev 5 (1999).
59. Jeremy Sugarman et al, The Cost of Ethics Legislation: A Look at the
Patient Self-Determination Act, 3 Kennedy Institute of Ethics J 387 (1993).
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Ende and his colleagues found that patients do indeed want
information. Thus, "the mean score for information seeking was [on
a 0-to-100 scale] 79.5 ± 11.5." But patients were considerably less
interested in making decisions: "On a scale where 0 indicates a very
low and 100 indicates a very high preference for decision making,
and 50 indicates a neutral attitude, the mean score for the study
population was 33.2 ± 12.6." Furthermore, "as patients were asked
to consider increasingly severe illnesses, their desires to make
decisions themselves declined."
Similarly, William Strull et al found that patients little yearned
to make their own decisions: "[N]early half (47%) of patients
preferred that the clinician make the therapeutic decisions 'using all
that is known about the medicines' but without the patient's
participation .... " A third "preferred that the clinician make the
decision 'but strongly consider the patient's opinion.' Only 19% of
the patients stated they wish to share equally with the clinician in
making the decision, and 3% wished to make the decision
themselves."
Interestingly enough, physicians over-estimated
patients' desire to make medical decisions: "In contrast to the
patient preferences, in the large majority of cases (78%) clinicians
believed that patients wanted to help make decisions. In only 22%
of cases did the clinician think the patient wanted the clinician
61
alone to decide."
. The Ende and Strull studies exemplify many others which
conclude that, while patients largely wish to be informed about their
medical circumstances, substantial numbers of them do not want to
make their own decisions, or perhaps even to participate in those
decisions in any truly significant way. Furthermore, the older
patients are and the sicker they get, the more they shun medical
decisions. Rather, they are willing to defer to doctors or family
62
members.
The sturdy, stalwart strength of this reluctance is suggested by
a fascinating inquiry from Ende et al. They asked doctors how they
would want decisions made should they have an upper-respiratory
tract infection, hypertension, or a myocardial infarction, all
"diseases that fall within the realm of their professional expertise."
Even doctors "preferred that their provider take the principal role as
decision maker." The differences in the reluctance of doctors and
patients to make their own decisions "were small." And when
"physicians who actually were enrolled as patients were compared

60. Jack Ende et al, Measuring Patients' Desire for Autonomy: Decision
Making and Information-Seeking Preferences Among Medical Patients, 4 J
General Internal Medicine 23 (1989).
61. William M. Strull et al, Do Patients Want to Participate in Medical
Decision Making?, 252 JAMA 2990 (1984).
62. I survey this literature at tedious length in Chapter 2 of The Practice of
Autonomy: Patients, Doctors and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998).
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with the regular patient population, in the setting of severe illness
no significant difference was found." Finally, like patients, doctors
became less willing to make their own decisions as their illness
63
worsened.
A similar pattern evidently appears in another kind of health
decision-purchasing health care. This is specially important
because "consumer-driven health care" is, as I said earlier, the latest
incarnation of the hydra-headed autonomy monster. For example,
when focus groups are shown the report cards that are intended to
inform consumers, they "commonly respond that they find the
information overwhelming and confusing and that they do not know
how to use the lava flow of information to make a decision. Many
say they prefer to have someone tell them which plan to choose."64
This kind of response horrifies autonomists, who believe that if
only people are dosed with enough "education" they will be prepared
and prompted to make their own decisions and want to do so.
However, Hibbard et al conclude that "even with extensive and
high-quality education programs, a significant portion of
beneficiaries will not be able to use the information to make
informed choices." Among the reasons is that the "options are
complex and require significant health care contextual information
to understand them. Many beneficiaries will need one-on-one help
to find their way to a satisfactory choice.'.ss
The evidence I have surveyed powerfully suggests that the gulf
between bioethical hopes for the autonomy principle and the actual
consequences of bioethical policies is unbridged. But it must always
be hard to show that the gulf is unbridgeable. I have adduced two
kinds of evidence for that proposition. In earlier sections, I argued
that the failure to bridge the gulf after decades of engineering
suggests that the bridge simply cannot be built. In this section, I
have argued that the failure to construct similar bridges in other
regulatory areas gives us yet further reason to doubt that the bridge
is feasible.
IV. PERESTROIKA?
Your education begins when what is called your education is
over - when you . . . have begun yourselves to work upon the
raw material for results which you do not see, cannot predict,
and which may be long in coming - when you take the fact
63. Jack Ende et al, Preferences for Autonomy When Patients Are
Physicians, 5 J General Internal Medicine 506 (1990). The physicians were
significantly less anxious for information than the patients.
64. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Informing Consumer Decisions in Health Care:
Implications from Decision·Making Research, 75 Milbank Quarterly 395, 398
(1997).
65. Judith H. Hibbard et al, Can Medicare Beneficiaries Make Informed
Choices?, 17 Health Affairs 181, 192 (1998).
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which life offers you for your appointed task. No man has
earned the right to intellectual ambition until he has learned to
lay his course by a star which he has never seen - to dig by the
divining rod for springs which he may never reach. In saying
this, I point to that which will make your study heroic. For I
say to you in all sadness of conviction, that to think great
thoughts you must be heroes as well as idealists.

Oliver Wendell Holmes
The Profession of the Law
At the heart of the bioethical agenda has been the effort to
transfer decisions to patients and to equip patients to make them
wisely. The law has been recruited to promote many such transfers,
primarily through mandated disclosures. But in area after area, the
bioethical agenda and the law implementing it seem to have
importantly failed, and no plausible reform of that law looks
significantly promising.
Grim as the evidence is, no amount of failure provokes
bioethicists to wonder whether a specific proposal, the bioethical
program, or the tools of bioethical regulation might be irredeemably
flawed. Failure only drives them to add layer upon layer of
Ptolemaic complexity. Were first-generation living wills laughably
vague? Strive for completeness. Were second-generation living
wills laughably complex? Solicit statements of"values." Were thirdgeneration living wills laughably opaque? Claim that they provoke
conversations with physicians or families. Do physicians fail to talk
with patients about care after incompetence? Educate them better.
Do physicians fail to respond to education? Educate them some
more, yea, unto seven times seventy. At some point, shouldn't
repeated failure lead you to ask why your program is not working
and whether it can ever work?
As I have insisted to the point of ennui, in this essay I can only
sample the evidence of failure.
But if my sample is at all
representative, bioethical programs, especially the law of bioethics,
have failed so dramatically that bioethics should be fundamentally
re-examined. What might that re-examination look like? Could it
be profitable?
The most constrained response to bioethical failure might be to
adjust the standards of bioethical success. We might, for example,
decide that patients should not be asked to make their own
decisions, but rather should be satisfied with what one might
pejoratively call ill-informed consent. Another constrained response
would be to conclude that specific parts of the bioethical program
are so hopeless that they should be abandoned altogether, even
while retaining the rest. For example, Angela Fagerlin and I have
made a systematic case that there is so little prospect that living
wills can ever work that they should be abandoned, but we argue
that a more modest device-the durable power of attorney-should
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be retained (since it can help resolve questions of authority to make
decisions for incompetent patients, presents patients a task within
their competence, and costs little). 66
Perhaps the most radical response to the failure of so many
bioethical policies would be to acknowledge that there is no a priori
reason there must be a field of bioethics. If useful things cannot be
said about bioethical issues, why slog on? Less radically, ifbioethics
has little to contribute to the formulation of good policy, then it
should be relegated to the work of theorizing until it has produced
theories that intelligently guide policy.
There may be a middle course. Once we have shown-if indeed
it can be shown-that the central bioethical enterprise of confiding
decisions to patients in some strong sense is doomed, we can ask
whether there are other issues about which helpful things can be
said and done. We could do this ad hoc, but I would attempt a
modestly more systematic approach.
I would start with the observation that bioethics' agenda largely
comprises subjects bioethicists find intellectually interesting and
ideologically agreeable. Bioethicists have offered patients what
bioethicists think they want for themselves-autonomy and the
ability to make medical decisions. Yet patients have in crucial ways
rejected the bioethicists' gift. What, then, if bioethicists asked not
what patients should want and instead asked what they do want?
What would such a patient-centered bioethics look like?
One could review and expand the
A quick clarification.
empirical literature about what patients say they want. But such a
simple picture of patients' preferences could not be dispositive.
Patients need not understand their interests better than anyone
else: Patients are likely to have only a poor idea of what they might
seek from a bioethical agenda because they have never thought
systematically about the subject.
But asking what patients
experience, what patients want, and what gives patients satisfaction
may provide illuminating (and sobering) insights into what the
bioethical agenda is and should be.
What principles might guide patients setting an agenda for
bioethics? Patients presumably care naught about the intellectual
fascination of issues. They care whether issues affect them, and
they want to change the things that harm them. This suggests two
criteria. First, bioethicists should concentrate on problems many
patients encounter. Second, bioethicists should ask whether a
problem lends itself to solution.
When I ask patients what they want from their physicians, I
usually receive two answers-competence and (in the broadest
possible sense) kindness. The former issue deals with a classic
problem in professional ethics-what level of skill and effort do
66. Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living
Will, Hastings Center Report 30 (March/April2004).
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professionals owe clients? The latter issue deals with a classic
problem in the relationship of professionals and client-what kinds
of interactions should clients hope for from professionals they hire?
Both issues raise questions about the virtues physicians should
study and practice.
When we put these considerations together, a major bioethical
topic like assisted suicide seems marginal because it affects so few
people. On the other hand, bioethics might be led to a problem it
67
has regrettably scanted:
"The undertreatment of pain in the
United States is well-documented in scientific literature." Studies
"have demonstrated continued inadequacies in treatment (1) of
those patient populations most likely to suffer from chronic and
acute pain, including terminally ill patients, cancer patients,
nursing home residents, elderly individuals, and chronic pain
patients, and (2) in those medical environments where acute pain is
routine, such as the emergency room, the post-operative unit, and
68
the intensive care unit."
For example, one large-scale "study of seriously ill hospitalized
patients [the SUPPORT study] demonstrated a high prevalence of
pain. Half of the patients in this study complained of pain and onesixth reported extremely severe pain of any frequency or moderately
severe pain occurring at least half of the time. Questioning
suggested that pain was related to chronic conditions, as well as to
the patients' acute illnesses and their treatment." This study "found
clinically important levels of pain and dissatisfaction with pain
control in all disease categories, including chronic obstructive
pulmonary disease and congestive heart failure, diseases that have
not been traditionally associated with pain." While pain was
virtually pervasive, some specialties failed more completely than
others: "Surgeons' patients reported increased levels of pain
compared with patients of other specialists. . . . Compared with
oncologists' patients, patients of pulmonologists or intensivists were
69
more dissatisfied with pain control."
Even "five years after the
67. In what follows, I will suggest that bioethics has under-examined
several areas. In each of these areas, one can find some writing. But the
question is not whether some articles can be located; it is whether a topic has
been given the attention it deserves and whether it has received little attention
compared with other bioethical topics. Pain is a good example. Admirable
efforts have been made to address the problem. (See Sandra H. Johnson,
Relieving Unnecessary, Treatable Pain for the Sake of Human Dignity, 29 J L,
Medicine & Ethics 11 (2001), for a discussion of some of them.) Nevertheless,
those efforts are slight compared with the severity of the problem and the
oceans of writing on other topics.
68. Amy J. Dilcher, Damned If They Do, Damned If They Don't: The Need
for a Comprehensive Public Policy to Address the Inadequate Management of
Pain, 13 Annals of Health Law 81, 83-84 (2004).
69. Norman A. Desbiens et al, Pain and Satisfaction With Pain Control in
Seriously Ill Hospitalized Adults: Findings From the SUPPORT Research
Investigations, 24 Critical Care Medicine 1953 (1996).
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completion of patient enrollment in SUPPORT" it appears that "pain
control persists as a major problem for hospitalized patients. These
patients are still in pain many months after their hospitalization
and experience pain and other symptoms even on their deathbeds." 70
In short, the undertreatment of pain affects far more people
than end-of-life issues like assisted suicide and even living wills.
The problem not only afflicts horrifying proportions of dying
patients, but millions of patients with undertreated chronic pain.
And gratifying improvement can probably be made in ameliorating
the problem: First, it is easier to change the behavior of physicians
71
than patients. Second, we already are making progress.
Or take another question of importance to most doctors and
most patients: Even though an increasingly central fact about
modern medical care is that it is delivered bureaucratically,
bioethics has had little to say about the patient and doctor in the
machine. Today, many of the ethical problems doctors (especially
young doctors) confront raise issues of the ethical obligations of
people operatin~ in organizations, not just issues of traditional
medical ethics. 7
And what are the ethical duties of medical
organizations to their employees, their clients, and their society?
Patients may also expect bioethicists to address another set of
problems they have hardly embraced. Bioethics has recommended
extensive changes in public policy, but it has scanted the ethical
dilemmas individual human beings face when questions of health
arise. Bioethics has routinely fobbed patients off with assurances
that they are autonomous and will be guided by their own "values."
Patients who want help thinking through their ethical obligations
may generally look elsewhere.
Some examples. (1) Bioethics has asked too infrequently about
the morality of abortion in general or when abortion is morally
permissible in a particular circumstance. (2) One of the largest
ethical issues the baby-boom generation faces is what obligations
adult children owe their enfeebled parents. Bioethics has barely
edged into this subject. 73 (3) Bioethics has had strangely little to say
about the value of human life and when it is legitimate to abandon

70. Norman A. Desbiens & Albert W. Wu, Pain and Suffering in Seriously
Ill Hospitalized Patients, 48 J American Geriatric Society S183, S185 (2000).
71. There are differences among hospitals that suggest that noteworthy
improvements in the treatment of pain are quite possible: "Patients at the worst
performing hospital reported about 75% higher levels of pain than those at the
hospital with the best performance. Anecdotally, at the best performing
hospital, pain control had been a major emphasis for several years before the
onset of SUPPORT." Ibid at S186.
72. See, e.g., Daniel F. Chambliss, Beyond Caring: Hospitals, Nurses, and
the Social Organization of Ethics (U Chicago Press, 1996).
73. There are some good starts. See, e.g., Hilde Lindemann Nelson &
James Lindemann Nelson, The Patient in the Family: An Ethics of Medicine
and Families (Routledge, 1995).
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it. (4) Bioethicists have written a good deal about whether and how
the definition of death should be manipulated in order to increase
organ donations, but they have been much less concerned to identify
and examine any duty to donate. (5) Finally, serious illness
confronts most patients with a moral crisis in which they must think
about whether their lives have been worth living and how their lives
can be made worthwhile in the throes of disease. 74 With a few fine
75
exceptions, bioethicists have not helped patients grapple with these
issues.
Patients will also be interested in the ethical distribution of
medical resources. Bioethicists have of course paid some attention
to rationing, but much work remains undone. The nature of that
work is generally well known, but many issues have been virtually
ignored. For instance, the primary device of bioethical policymandatory disclosure-benefits the well educated and well situated
far more than the illiterate and poor. Disclosures are more useful to
the former than the latter because the former are better able to
understand them and understand how to use them. Furthermore,
bioethical reforms divert resources from providing medical services.
The well-off need not mind this because they already have access to
good services. Those who are not prosperous are less fortunate; for
them the diversion is usually a foolish allocation of resources.
This leads me to a final observation. Bioethics is about ethical
obligations. But bioethics has a curiously narrow view of when
people might owe each other duties. The obligations doctors and
researchers contractually assume toward patients have been central
to bioethics. But patients themselves think seriously about what
they owe other people and about how they can live ethical lives.
Bioethics has been so preoccupied with liberating patients from
medical imperialism that it has hardly noticed the earnestness with
which patients take their moral lives and obligations. No wonder
we cannot adopt some system of health insurance, when we find it
so difficult to think in terms of a duty to help other people. 76
I have argued that the crusade to put bioethical principles into
law and policy seems to have failed in many serious ways. That
failure has been little perceived and less discussed. In part, this is
because bioethics has been unwilling to become an effective and
ethical "policy science." That is, it has been loathe to think about
realistic ways of implementing its policies, about its policies' costs,
or about trade-offs among the goals of bioethics and other social

74. I discuss this in Carl E. Schneider, The Practice of Autonomy: Patients,
Doctors, and Medical Decisions (Oxford U Press, 1998).
75. E.g., Arthur W. Frank, At the Will of the Body: Reflections on Illness
(Houghton Miffiin, 1991); Arthur W. Frank, The Wounded Storyteller: Body,
Illness, and Ethics (University of Chicago Press, 1995).
76. See Lois Shepherd, Assuming Responsibility, 41 Wake Forest L Rev 445
(2006).
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goals in health affairs.
But the problem is also political and ideological. The political
crusade against medical imperialism and the ideological embrace of
the autonomy principle are powerful forces, forces that tend to
suppress reflection about and criticism of bioethics. But the problem
goes deeper. The apparent failure of bioethical policies raises
disturbing questions we would rather not think about. First, if
those policies don't work, must we return to the bad old days of
medical paternalism? Second, it is hard to review the failure of
those policies without sounding elitist, without seeming to sneer at
the people who have not managed to make informed and acute
medical decisions for themselves.
But this is what must make your study heroic. No one wants to
return to the bad old days. And the failure of bioethical policies is
not due to ignorant, stupid, and cowardly people. On the contrary.
In my research among patients, I am always moved by the good
sense, decency, and courage with which people suffering from
dreadful illness live their lives. The problem lies not in the failings
of some people; it lies in the limits of us all.
Bioethics has found comfort in its traditional enemy and its
organizing principle. It is not pleasant to contemplate rethinking
bioethics without the help of a familiar foe and an established
principle. But it is time to try.

